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The relative performance evaluation (RPE) hypothesis holds that executive 
compensation should not depend on uncontrollable exogenous shocks. Nevertheless, 
prior studies often find limited empirical support for this hypothesis in part because it 
is difficult to identify peers exposed to the same exogenous shocks. I propose a new 
way to identify peers and to test the RPE hypothesis in the context of a specific shock. 
In particular, I select peers based on the sensitivity of their stock returns to exchange 
rate fluctuations. I find evidence that firms respond to large exchange rate movements 
by ex post adjusting their peer selection to include peers with similar exchange rate 
risk exposure. Moreover, after allowing for ex post peer group adjustments, I find a 
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Setting Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation is one of the most important 
issues for firms. Paying for performance is crucial to mitigate agency cost, and this is 
especially important for CEOs whose unobservable efforts and actions can 
significantly affect the distribution of firm performance. However, it is difficult to 
accurately measure the degree of firm performance for which CEOs are responsible. 
Firm performance is associated with both CEO decisions and exogenous shocks that 
are outside of CEO’s control. It is well understood that firms should not reward or 
punish CEOs for performance reflecting exogenous shocks because it will be wasteful 
and costly. Greater uncertainty in CEO compensation necessitates a greater risk 
premium for the additional compensation risk (Holmstrom, 1979). 
A large stream of literature examines how exogenous shocks can be filtered out from 
executive compensation. The relative performance evaluation (RPE) hypothesis 
implies that this can be achieved by making compensation contingent on peer 
performance (Holmstrom, 1982; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). Despite the 
theoretical appeal of this hypothesis, prior studies do not find consistent empirical 
evidence to support it (Murphy, 1999; Abowd and Kaplan, 1999; Prendergast, 1999). 
An important difference among the empirical studies of testing RPE is the selection of 
peer firms. Some use firms covered by the stock market index (Garvey and Milbourn, 
2003), others choose firms in the same industry (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a; 
Antle and Smith, 1986), and still others select firms in the same geographic region 
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(Barro and Barro, 1990). Clearly, the choice of peers determines the extent to which 
exogenous shocks can be filtered out and critically affects tests of the RPE 
hypothesis. At the same time, it is practically difficult to consider all relevant 
dimensions, such as industry, size, growth, diversification, and financial constraints, 
that affect the capacity of a peer group to filter out common shocks. Thus, one 
possible explanation for the failure to get consistent empirical results to support RPE 
is that prior studies do not identify the appropriate peer group.  
Albuquerque (2009) contributes to the literature by showing that peer selection based 
on both industry and frim size captures many of the important dimensions of risk 
exposure. Gong et al. (2011) corroborate this finding using data on compensation 
benchmarking peers from proxy statement disclosures. Nevertheless, two important 
issues remain unaddressed. First, all prior studies assume that peers are selected ex 
ante, which is inconsistent with the theory predicting that firms should use all 
information available to ex post filter out exogenous shocks. In particular, major 
macroeconomic shocks cannot be predicted and ex ante selected peers may not be 
effective in the presence of some specific shocks. Second, the testing power of most 
existing studies is low because they cannot measure the magnitude of exogenous 
shocks and identify sub-samples where the effect of RPE should be most 
pronounced.1 
 
1 There are two necessary conditions for firms to apply for RPE to filter out the effect of exogenous 
shocks on firm performance: (1) there are exogenous shocks; and (2) the exogenous shocks have effect 
on performance of firms included in the sample. Some firms may only suffer from some specific types 
of shocks, such as exchange rate shock or oil price shock, while are insensitive to other shocks. Most 
studies test RPE generally in the context of overall external shocks across all time periods for all firms. 
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In this paper, I test RPE in the context of a specific macroeconomic shock.2 With the 
growth of global economy, the US firms strengthen their connections to international 
market. The exchange rate volatility can affect firm performance (Itagaki, 1981; 
Dominguez and Tesar, 2006), and cause different exposures to exchange rate risk 
(Allayannis and Ofek, 2001). Clearly, firms with divisions abroad or with significant 
transactions in foreign countries are directly exposed to exchange rate fluctuations. 
However, even firms with no significant international transactions are exposed 
indirectly as long as they compete against international firms for US market share.  
I predict that exposure to exchange rate risk is a criterion in identifying peers and that 
this criterion is more important for peer selection when large exchange rate 
movements actually occurred. My empirical analyses examine whether firms select 
peers ex ante, as assumed in all prior work, or whether they adjust their peer selection 
ex post, depending on the magnitude of exchange rate movements. Moreover, my 
research design also allows me to increase testing power by excluding firm-year 
observations with little or no exposure to exchange rate movements.  
Specifically, I first regress firm stock return on the return of dollar index to compute 
the sensitivity (exposure) of each firm to exchange rate risk, and then calculate the 
stock return of peers with similar exposure to exchange rate risk. To test for RPE, I 
 
Under this condition, we cannot distinguish observations for which there are shocks and firms suffer 
from these shocks from other observations. 
2 I mainly focus on exchange rate risk although I also present additional analyses that pertain to oil 
price and interest rate risk.  
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use three ways to select firm-year observations exposed to large exchange rate 
movements. The first sub-sample only includes observations during the time periods 
within which the fluctuation of dollar index is large; the second sub-sample only 
consists of firms in industries that are most sensitive to the fluctuation of dollar index; 
the third sub-sample only comprises observations in the overlap of the first and 
second sub-samples.  
Using peers with similar exposure to exchange rate risk, I find strong support for the 
RPE hypothesis using both aggregate and firm-specific regressions. I also show that 
performance of peers with similar exposure to exchange rate risk is significantly more 
effective in filtering out shocks in the sub-samples where large exchange rate 
movements actually occurred. This implies that firms adjust peer selection ex post 
after exchange rate shock happened. In additional analyses, I find similar results for 
oil price risk, but no significant results for interest rate risk.  
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it provides evidence that 
exposure to a specific macroeconomic shock is an important criterion in selecting 
peers. Second, this paper shows that firms adjust peer selection for optimal risk 
sharing purposes whenever large macroeconomic shocks occur. This finding casts 
doubt on the common assumption in prior work that peers are selected ex ante and/or 
that peer selection remains largely constant over time. Third, this paper introduces a 
new research design that considerably increases the statistical power when testing the 
RPE hypothesis.  
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews prior literature and 
states hypotheses, section 3 discusses the research design, section 4 presents the 
empirical results, section 5 considers extensions to oil price and interest rate risk, and 
section 6 concludes.   
2. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1. Theoretical Background 
There is a moral hazard problem in setting CEO compensation contract because 
CEOs’ unobservable efforts and actions can significantly affect the distribution of 
firm performance. Holmstrom (1979) shows that the CEO compensation contract can 
be improved by including any ex post available information signal even if it is only 
imperfectly reflective of the CEO’s actions. Based on this theory, the hypothesis of 
relative performance evaluation (RPE) argues that firms can filter out the effect of 
exogenous shocks by making compensation contingent on the performance of peer 
firms (Holmstrom, 1982; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). 
Several studies caution that the RPE argument only holds in the absence of strategic 
interaction among peer firms (Vrettos, 2013; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Fumas, 
1992), e.g., in the absence of collusion among peers. Also, RPE may give rise to 
excessive risk taking if the CEO anticipates that exogenous risks will always be fully 
filtered out. For example, RPE may reduce incentives to engage in hedging activities, 
to purchase insurance, or to exercise prudence when entering risky foreign countries.  
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2.2. Literature Review 
Many empirical studies examine whether firms use RPE to filter out the effects of 
external shocks on firm performance. The results of exiting empirical studies are 
mixed. Some find evidence to support RPE, while others fail to do so. 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) identify peer firms as those in the same industry and 
find evidence to support RPE in compensation level analyses, but not in the change in 
compensation level analyses. Garvey and Milbourn (2003) find evidence to support 
RPE for firms with younger and less wealthy managers, but the results do not support 
RPE for average firms. Antle and Smith (1986) identify peer firms as those in the 
same industry and use stock return to measure firm performance, and they find that 
only 16 out of 39 firms support RPE. The results of Gibbons and Murphy (1990) 
support RPE when firm performance is measured by stock return. With the same 
sample of Gibbons and Murphy (1990) but different measures of compensation and 
performance, Jensen and Murphy (1990) do not find evidence to support RPE. The 
results of Janakiraman et al. (1992) support RPE when peer firms are identified as 
those in the same industry and firm performance is measured by stock return. Barro 
and Barro (1990) do not find evidence to support RPE with peer firm identification of 
the US largest commercial banks within the same geographical region. Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001) find that CEOs are paid for luck when peer firms are identified 
by industry, and this is more likely for poorly governed firms.  
One main difference among the above studies is the criterion to choose peer firms, 
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and it is also the big challenge to implement (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Baker, 
2002) or test (Parrino, 1997) RPE. The most popular and easy way is to use stock 
market index or firms in the same industry as peer firms, assuming that they have 
similar exposure to exogenous shocks. However, there are many aspects that are 
related with similar exposure, such as the cost to respond to shocks (Thomas, 1990), 
the financial and borrowing credit constraint (Fazzari et al., 1988 and Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 1994), the degree of diversification (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994), the 
operating leverage, and the growth options. There are two problems if we include all 
these characteristics in selecting peer firms. First, it is hard to accurately measure 
some characteristics, such as the cost to respond to shocks and the growth option. 
Second, we will identify too few peer firms if we consider all these characteristics, 
and this will cause very noisy results in filtering out external shocks. 
Even though these characteristics capture different aspects of firms, they are 
dependent on each other. They are all related to firm size (Albuquerque, 2009). Small 
firms tend to have lower diversification, larger financial and borrowing credit 
constraints, and smaller operating leverage. Albuquerque (2009) implicitly shows that 
firm size is monotonically associated with these firm characteristics and is a good 
indicator to identify peer firms in testing RPE. In addition, Gong et al. (2011) 
explicitly shows that firms actually select firms in the same industry and same firm 
size quartile as peers. 
Albuquerque (2009) contributes to the literature by showing that peer firms should be 
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identified by both industry and firm size and that different peer selection criterion 
may explain the prior inconsistent results in testing RPE. However, the industry-size 
criterion is not the only criterion to choose peers and cannot rule out other possible 
peer selection criteria. In addition, it is unclear whether firms adjust peer selection ex 
post after one macroeconomic shock happened. 
The above studies test RPE implicitly by determining peers ex ante with one uniform 
rule, such as in the same industry or in the same industry and same firm size quartile. 
Other studies test RPE explicitly by analyzing the actual selected peers released in 
firm proxy statements (Gong et al., 2011). Even for these actual selected peers, they 
are chosen ex ante. Black et al. (2012) argue that firms may use peers which are not 
disclosed in their proxy statements. It is difficult for firms to predict macroeconomic 
shocks before peer selection released in firm proxy statements. However, firms have 
intention to adjust peer selection ex post after one specific macroeconomic shock 
occurred. Very few existing studies find evidence to support this argument. 
There is another branch of literature that explains why RPE does not hold in empirical 
tests. One possible reason is the peer selection issue (Albuquerque, 2009). The other 
potential reason is firm’s ability to find peers. Albuquerque (2014) argues that high 
growth firms do not use RPE to filter out the effects of exogenous shocks because 




To solve the moral hazard problem in setting CEO compensation, firms need to filter 
out the effect of exogenous shocks on firm performance by the performance of peer 
firms. The desirable peers should have similar exposure to and ability to deal with 
exogenous shocks, and the peer selection determines the extent to which the effect of 
exogenous shocks can be filtered out. Ideal peer firms should be similar in several 
aspects, such as industry, size, diversification, financial constraints, etc., and 
Albuquerque (2009) shows that industry and size can seize most of these aspects. 
Based on the results of Albuquerque (2009), I propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a negative relation between CEO compensation and performance of 
industry peers with similar size. 
However, the industry-size criterion cannot rule out other possible peer selection 
criteria. Another way to generate peer firms is to calculate the effect of a specific 
macroeconomic shock on firm performance and then identify firms with similar 
exposure to that shock as peers. An important criterion to choose peer firms could be 
similar exposure to exchange rate shock. The US firms are more likely to connect to 
international market either directly or indirectly with the growth of global economy. 
The exchange rate volatility can affect firm performance (Itagaki, 1981; Dominguez 
and Tesar, 2006). This leads to the next hypothesis. 
H2: There is a negative relation between CEO compensation and performance of 
peers with similar exposure to exchange rate risk. 
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Most existing studies test RPE in the context that peers are selected ex ante. Even for 
the actual selected peers released in firm proxy statements, they are chosen ex ante. 
However, the theoretical foundation of RPE (Holmstrom 1979) argues that firms 
should choose peers ex post. Firms could adjust peer selection ex post when exchange 
rate shock occurred, and the new included peer firms should have similar exposure to 
the exchange rate shock. Since it is difficult to predict exchange rate shock, firms 
cannot identify the desirable peers in advance. If they want to apply for RPE, they 
have to adjust peer selection ex post. In addition, this type of peer adjustment is for 
effective risk sharing, while not for self-service to justify high CEO payment. This 
motivates my last hypothesis. 
H3: The relationship in H2 will be stronger when the fluctuation of exchange rate is 
high. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN   
3.1. Data and Sample Selection 
I get CEO compensation data from the ExecuComp dataset, financial measures from 
the Compustat dataset, monthly stock returns from the Center for Research in Security 
Price (CRSP), inflation measure from the CRSP-US Treasure and Inflation Indexes, 
dollar index (Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index: Broad – TWEXB, end of period 
monthly) from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, crude oil monthly price from 
the website of Index Mundi (it is a “simple average of three spot prices; Dated Brent, 
West Texas Intermediate, and the Dubai Fateh, US Dollars per Barrel”), and one year 
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bond index from CRSP-US Treasury and Inflation Indexes. 
The time period is from Jan. 1995, when dollar index data are available, to Dec. 2015. 
I only include observations covered by both CRSP and ExecuComp with valid values 
for all variables. Small firms whose total asset is less than 10M and firms with less 
than 10 years observations are excluded. Table 1 shows the details of sample selection 
process. Finally, 20,830 observations with 1334 firms are included in the sample. 
3.2. Variables 
The dependent variable ("#$%&'()) is the natural log of inflation adjusted total 
CEO annual compensation in Jan. 1992 dollar. Stock return is used to measure firm 
and peer performance. The firm stock return is computed by +,- ./011203	5)678	9:)291/.<<./011203	(1=30)(61	90):	7037230):>	?@	ABC . For the calculation of one key 
independent variable---industry-size peer return %DDEFDGHI() , I just follow the 
process of Albuquerque (2009). First, I merge CRSP and Compustat and exclude 
small firms whose total asset is less than 10M. I then calculate the quartile of firm 
market value at the beginning of the year based on all firms in the merged dataset for 
each year. Under this design, the relative peer firms will be included even though they 
may not be covered by ExecuComp. For each firm, the industry-size peer stock return 
is calculated by the equal-weight average of stock returns of the peer firms that are in 
the same industry (two-digits SIC) and same firm size (firm market value at the 
beginning of the year) quartile in that year, excluding the firm itself. If the number of 
peer firms is less than two, the industry-size peer stock return is calculated by the 
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industry average. 
To calculate the other key independent variable---stock return of peers with similar 
exposure to exchange rate risk %DDEFDG#J() , I first run the regression, for each 
firm, of real firm stock return on real dollar index return in the annual level across 
different years. Only firms with at least 10 observations are kept in the sample. The 
estimated coefficient is a measure of the firm’s sensitivity to exchange rate risk. Then, 
I rank the coefficients in the order of scale into 7 groups. Firms in the same group 
have similar exposure to exchange rate risk. The stock return of peers with similar 
exposure to exchange rate risk is computed by the average of annual stock returns of 
peers, in the same exchange rate exposure group and same year, that are calculated at 
the end of each peer’s fiscal year, excluding the firm itself. The stock returns of peers 
with similar exposure to other risks are computed in the same way. 
According to prior literature, the following control variables are also included in the 
regressions: firm size measured by the natural log of sales, growth options measured 
by the ratio of the firm market value to the book value of assets at the beginning of a 
year, CEO tenure measured by the natural log of the length of time period of being 
CEO3, idiosyncratic variance measured by the difference between the variance of firm 
stock return and the variance of industry stock return over the past 35 months, CEO 
chair dummy (whether the CEO is also the board chair), CEO ownership dummy 
(whether the CEO ownership share is smaller than the sample median in the year), 
 
3 If the length of time period of being CEO is less than one year, the observation is excluded. 
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and interlock dummy (whether the CEO is involved in the interlock relationship that 
asks disclosure in the proxy statement). 
The variables of CEO compensation and stock return of peers with similar exposure 
to exchange rate risk are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent.4 Table 2 shows 
the descriptive statistics. The variables have similar mean values as the ones in 
Albuquerque (2009), expect for the interlock dummy variable whose mean is smaller.  
3.3 Selection of Specific Shocks 
The purpose of this paper is not to find an effective way to select peers that can filter 
out exogenous shocks. I try to find an easy way to select peers under one specific 
macroeconomic shock. Thus, the selection of specific macroeconomic shock is a 
crucial part of the research design. A desirable specific shock for RPE testing should 
meet three criteria. First, it should be possible to measure its effect on firm 
performance and identify when and for which firms it affects. Second, it should have 
a substantial effect on firm performance so that firms are motivated to use RPE to 
filter out the shock. Third, it should have different effects on different firms so that 
peer selection becomes a non-trivial issue.  
I select exchange rate (main test), oil price, and interest rate shocks for the RPE 
testing in this paper. Intuitively, these are common and significant specific shocks that 
firms are facing. Since we have observed measures for exchange rate, interest rate, 
and oil price, and we can calculate their effects on firm performance, the first criterion 
 
4 Since Albuquerque (2009) does not winsorize any variable, I only winsorize these two variables to 
make the results comparable with the ones in Albuquerque (2009). 
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is met. Even though, intuitively, those shocks also meet the second criterion, I 
quantitatively show their effects on firm performance in table 3. 
The top section of panel A in table 3 shows the mean real monthly returns of dollar 
index, interest rate index, oil price index, and S&P500 index and their standard 
deviations in the period from Jan. 1992 to Dec. 2015. 
In the aggregate level analysis, I regress real monthly firm return on real monthly 
return of each index. KLEMFDG() = O< + O.HQRDSFDG() + T()                                  (1) 
where O. is the index elasticity of stock price. It measures the percentage change of 
stock price for 1% change of the index. The results are shown in the middle section of 
panel A in table 3. The minimum absolute value of elasticity is 0.09 for oil price 
index, which is roughly 10% of the S&P 500 index elasticity (1.02). Since the 
volatility of each index may be quiet different, I also calculate the absolute value of 
the product of each elasticity and the standard deviation of monthly return for each 
index, which measures the effect on firm return for the change of one standard 
deviation. The minimum value (0.0037 for dollar index) is roughly 10% of the value 
for S&P 500 index (0.0426). 
Since some firms respond positively, while other firms respond negatively, to the 
change in the index, some effects are cancelled out in the aggregate level analysis. To 
solve this problem, I run regression (1) for each firm, and then calculate the mean 
absolute value of elasticity across firms. The results are reported in the bottom section 
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of panel A in table 3. The minimum value of the product of the elasticity and standard 
deviation (0.0218 for dollar index) is roughly 40% of the value for S&P 500 index. 
The above results show that the selected shocks have significant effects on firm 
performance. In addition, the big difference between the aggregate level and firm 
level analysis indicates that these three shocks affect some firms positively and others 
negatively. This provides some support for the third criterion. 
Panel B in table 3 shows the result of sensitivity analysis for some major world 
currencies. Some sensitivities are larger than the sensitivity to dollar index, while 
others are smaller. To capture the overall effect, I use dollar index for the analysis in 
this paper. 
3.4. Models 
Based on the model in Albuquerque (2009), the following model (2) is used to test 
H1. "#$%&'() = "< + O.KLEMFDG() + OU%DDEFDGHI() + OV",QGE,+W&EL&X+DY()+ T()																																																																																																																		(2) 
where CEOPay is the natural log of inflation adjusted total CEO annual compensation 
in Jan. 1992 dollar; FirmRet is real firm stock return; and PeerRetIS is real stock 
return of peers in the same industry and size quartile, excluding the firm itself. If H1 
is true, we expect OU < 0. It means that firms use industry-size peer performance to 
filter out external shocks. 
H2 is tested by model (3). 
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"#$%&'() = "< + O.KLEMFDG() + OU%DDEFDGHI() + OV%DDEFDG#J() +O^",QGE,+W&EL&X+DY() + T()                                           (3) 
PeerRetEX is real stock return of peers in the same exchange rate risk exposure 
group, excluding the firm itself. If H2 is supported, then OV < 0. It indicates that 
performance of peers with similar exposure to exchange rate risk has incremental 
power to filter out the effect of external shocks. This test is conservative because 
some peers with similar exposure to exchange rate risk are already included in the 
industry-size peer group. To mitigate this effect, I also run model (3) without industry-
size peer performance. 
To test H3, I run model (3) with three sub-samples under which the effect of exchange 
rate risk is larger. The first sub-sample only includes observations during the time 
periods within which the fluctuation of dollar index is large; the second sub-sample 
only consists of firms in industries that are most sensitive to the fluctuation of dollar 
index; the third sub-sample only comprises observations in the overlap of the first and 
second sub-samples. Additional, I also run the full-sample regression with sub-sample 
indicator. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
4.1. Full Sample Analysis 
Table 4 shows the regression results for the full sample. The dependent variable is the 
CEO total compensation. Consistent with Albuquerque (2009), the estimated 
coefficient of industry-size peer return is significantly negative at 1% level in model 
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(1). This provides support for H1. The estimated coefficient of stock return of peers 
with similar exposure to exchange rate risk is also significantly negative at 10% level 
in model (2) and (3). Thus, performance of peers with similar exposure to exchange 
rate risk has incremental power to filter out the effect of external shocks in the general 
RPE testing. H2 is supported. In this sense, this paper finds another significant 
dimension in identifying right peers in the general RPE testing.5 
4.2. Sub-sample Analysis 
In this section, I test H3 using sub-samples with which the effect of exchange rate risk 
is more salient. I generate three sub-samples: the variance sub-sample only includes 
observations in the time periods when the volatility of dollar index is high (the 
variance of dollar index across the past 12 months is larger than 5); the industry sub-
sample only includes observations in the industries that are most sensitive to the 
change of dollar index (top 36 industries); the variance-industry sub-sample only 
includes observations in both of the above two sub-samples. 
The results are shown in table 5. There are three interesting findings in this table. 
First, for the variance and variance-industry sub-samples, both the magnitude and 
significance level of the estimated coefficient for the exchange rate peers increase, 
compared with the result in the full sample. Even though the significance level does 
not increase, the magnitude is larger in the industry sub-samples. It indicates that 
 
5 In alternative specifications (untabulated), I use return on equity (ROE) instead of stock return in my 
analyses. Similar to prior studies, I find no supportive evidence for RPE using accounting returns. I 
also use salary, bonus, and equity compensations as alternative measures of the dependent variable but 
find little supportive evidence for RPE (untabulated).  
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firms adjust CEO compensation ex post when the exchange rate risk is high. Thus, H3 
is supported. Additional, this result shows that the testing power of the model 
becomes stronger in the sub-samples after I exclude the noisy observations. Second, 
the estimated coefficient for industry-size peers becomes smaller and insignificant in 
the industry and variance-industry sub-samples, compared with the result in the full 
sample. Its significance level in the variance sub-sample also decreases. Third, the 
estimated coefficient for exchange rate peers is larger than the estimated coefficient 
for industry-size peers for all the sub-samples. These results indicate that firms use the 
performance of peers with similar exposure to exchange rate risk, while not industry-
size peers, to filter out the effect of exchange rate risk when the exchange rate shock 
occurred. More generally, we can argue that firms may use different criteria to 
identify peers to filter out the effect of different shocks. The results for oil price shock 
and interest rate shock also provide some supports to this argument. 
The last column in table 5 shows the regression results for the full sample with an 
indicator variable for the variance-industry sub-sample and an interaction variable 
that is the product of that indicator variable and the stock return of peers with similar 
exposure to exchange rate risk. Consistent with the above results, the estimated 
coefficient of the interaction is significantly negative. 
As a robustness check, I also do the similar analysis for the case that the dependent 
variable is the change in CEO total compensation, which captures the variable part of 
CEO compensation. Table 6 presents the result. The results are consistent with the 
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ones in table 5. Thus, H3 is also supported under this condition. 
4.3. Firm Specific Analysis 
For the regressions in table 5, the data are pooled time-series and cross-sectional, and 
then the model assumes that the estimated RPE coefficient is constant across different 
firms. However, the RPE coefficient can be different for different firms. To release 
this constrain, I run firm-specific regressions for each firm. In these regressions, only 
the constant, firm performance, and peer performance are included as independent 
variables. The mean and median of estimated coefficients are reported in table 7. The 
t-statistics for the test that the mean of estimated coefficient is equal to zero are also 
reported. 
Panel A shows the results when only one single peer return is included in the 
regression. Consistent with the results in table 4, the mean estimated RPE coefficient 
is significantly negative when peer performance is measured by the industry-size peer 
stock return and exchange rate peer stock return. This indicates that the exchange rate 
peer stock return is a good candidate to filter out external shocks. Thus, H2 is also 
supported by the firm specific analysis. 
Panel B exhibits the results when both peer returns are included in the regression. The 
mean estimated RPE coefficient is significantly negative when peer performance is 
measured by the exchange rate peer stock return, but is insignificant and positive 
when peer performance is measured by the industry-size peer stock return. This shows 
that the effect of shocks is more likely to be filtered out by the performance of 
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exchange rate peer firms than by the performance of industry-size peer firms. 
5. EXTENSION TO OTHER SHOCKS 
If the arguments that firms adjust peer selection ex post after one specific 
macroeconomic shock happened and that the RPE testing power will increase if we 
exclude the noisy observations from the sample are true, we should observe similar 
results for the analyses of other specific shocks. With the same procedure, I analyze 
for oil price shock and interest rate shock in this section. 
5.1. Oil Price Shock 
Table 8 presents the results for oil price shock. I argue that firms would like to use the 
performance of peers with similar exposure to oil price risk to filter out the effect of 
oil price shock ex post, and this result is more likely to be supported in the sub-sample 
without noisy observations. The results are consistent with my arguments. 
The variance sub-sample only includes observations in the time periods when the 
volatility of oil price is high (the variance of oil price across the past 12 months is 
larger than 20); the industry sub-sample only includes observations in the industries 
which are most sensitive to the change of oil price (top 36 industries). 
For the full sample, the estimated coefficient for oil price peers is not significant, even 
though it is negative. But, it becomes significantly negative, and the magnitude is 
much larger, in the variance and variance-industry sub-samples. Interestingly, the 
estimated coefficient for industry-size peers becomes insignificant in the variance and 
variance-industry sub-samples. These results show that firms are like to use the 
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performance of peers with similar exposure to oil price risk to filter out the effect of 
oil price shock. 
5.2. Interest Rate Shock 
Table 9 shows the results for interest rate shock. The variance sub-sample only 
includes observations in the time periods when the volatility of interest rate index is 
high (the variance of interest rate index across the past 12 months is larger than 30); 
the industry sub-sample only includes observations in the industries that are most 
sensitive to the change of interest rate index (top 36 industries). 
The results are consistent with my general argument, but not significant. The 
estimated coefficients for interest rate peers in the industry and variance-industry sub-
samples are larger than that in the full sample, but not significant. A potential reason 
for insignificant results is that interest rate risk is more predictable and/or well hedged 
by firms, then firms do not need to apply for RPE to filter out its effect on firm 
performance. 
6. CONCLUSION  
This paper tests RPE in the context of one specific macroeconomic shock. Under this 
condition, we can have an easier way to identify peers---firms having similar 
exposure to the macroeconomic shock, and we can test whether firms adjust peer 
selection ex post after one macro shock occurred. Additional, the model’s testing 
power will be higher because we can exclude noisy observations for the specific 
macroeconomic shock. 
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This paper has three main findings. First, I find another significant dimension in 
identifying right peers---similar exposure to exchange rate risk. It has some 
incremental power to filter out the effect of external shocks in the general RPE 
testing, based on the model in Albuquerque (2009). Second, firms adjust peer 
selection ex post after one macroeconomic shock happened. Most prior studies select 
peers ex ante in a somewhat arbitrary way. Even for those actual peers released in 
firm proxy statements, they are chosen ex ante. However, firms may adjust peer 
selection ex post after one macro shock occurred, using peers with similar exposure to 
that shock. The results in this paper support this argument. Third, firms may use 
different criteria to identify peers to filter out the effect of different shocks. In 
addition, the research design in this paper increases the RPE testing power because 
the models exclude noisy observations. 
There are also some limitations in this paper. First, since it is very hard to find a 
suitable measure of firms’ hedging for macroeconomic shocks, I do not analyze the 
case that firms actively hedge macroeconomic shocks. Second, only three 
macroeconomic shocks are discussed in this paper. More analyses for other 
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CEOPay: the natural log of inflation adjusted total CEO annual compensation in Jan. 
1992 dollar. 
ChgCEOPay: the change in natural log of inflation adjusted total CEO annual 
compensation in Jan. 1992 dollar. 
Firm Ret: real firm stock return calculated by +,- ./011203	5)678	9:)291/.<<./011203	(1=30)(61	90):	7037230):>	?@	ABC . 
PeerRetIS: real stock return of peers in the same industry and size quartile, excluding 
the firm itself. 
PeerRetEX: real stock return of peers in the same exchange rate risk exposure group, 
excluding the firm itself. 
PeerRetOP: real stock return of peers in the same oil price risk exposure group, 
excluding the firm itself. 
PeerRetIN: real stock return of peers in the same interest rate risk exposure group, 
excluding the firm itself. 
Indicator: whether in the var- industry sub-sample. 
Interaction: PeerRetEX (PeerRetOP, PeerRetIN)	×Sub-sample (var- industry) 
indicator. 
Ln (Sale): the natural log of inflation adjusted sale in Jan. 1992 dollar at the beginning 
of fiscal year. 
GrowOption: the ratio of market value to total asset at the beginning of fiscal year. 
The market value is calculated by “total asset – book value of equity + market value 
of equity”, and the market value of equity is calculated by the product of the number 
of outstanding shares and the closed stock price. 
CeoTenure: the number of years since the CEO takes office. 
IndVar: idiosyncratic variance calculated by the variance difference between the firm 
stock return and the average industry stock return over the past 35 months. 
ChairD: a dummy variable to indicate whether the CEO is also the board chair 
CeoEquityOwnD: a dummy variable to indicate whether the percentage share 
ownership of the CEO is less than the median in that year. The percentage share 
ownership of the CEO is computed by the ratio of the number of shares owned by the 
CEO and the number of total outstanding shares.  
InterlockD: a dummy variable to indicate whether the CEO is listed in the 










Table 1: Sample Selection 
 Num. of obs. 
Obs. From Compustat 233,868 
-neither coverd by CRSP nor have valid stock return 77,302 
-total asset less than 10M 33,709 
-not covered by ExecuComp 85,082 
-negative CEO compensation, sale, market value, equity 6,040 
-missing values for independent variables 998 
-firms with less than 10 years observations 9,907 
Final sample 20,830 
This table shows the sample selection process. 
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Table 2: Description Statistics 
  No. of obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
      
Ln (CEO 
Compensation) 20,830 7.684451 1.009566 5.36144 10.0208 
FirmRet 20,830 0.0609877 0.4198664 -3.2193 3.34937 
PeerRetIS 20,825 0.0797373 0.2846554 -1.8401 2.09826 
PeerRetEX 20,830 0.1326293 0.1812927 -0.5687 0.61349 
Ln (Sale) 20,830 7.081909 1.601076 -2.7646 12.5431 
GrowOption 20,830 1.945952 1.811247 0.40065 105.09 
CeoTenure 20,830 8.864378 7.716551 1 61.789 
IndVar 20,830 0.0119997 0.0826528 -0.0221 6.28942 
ChairD 20,830 0.6277004 0.4834292 0 1 
CeoEquityOwnD 20,830 0.5259241 0.4993395 0 1 
InterlockD 20,830 0.0422468 0.2011564 0 1 
This table shows the statistics of all variables. 






























































































































































































































































































































 Table 3: Sensitivity Measurement 
Panel B: Specific Currency     
  Euro return CNY return GBP return JPY return CHF return 
Mean of monthly return -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0021 -0.003 
Std. dev. of monthly return 0.0257 0.0246 0.0229 0.0261 0.0269 
No. of obs. 203 288 288 288 288 
Aggregate Level      
Elasticity -0.5446 0.1009 -0.2671 0.1031 -0.0605 
Abs(Elasticity*S.D.) 0.0140 0.0025 0.0061 0.0027 0.0016 
No. of obs. 1,160,781 1,799,101 1,799,101 1,799,101 1,799,101 
Firm Level      
Elasticity (absolute value) 1.0278 4.1935 0.9669 0.7347 0.7257 
Abs(Elasticity*S.D.) 0.0264 0.1032 0.0221 0.0192 0.0195 
No. of firms 12,559 17,115 17,115 17,115 17,115 
      This table shows the sensitivity of each macro index or currency. 
      Mena of monthly return: the average monthly return of each macro index or currency. 
      Std. dev. of monthly return: the standard deviation of monthly return of each macro index or currency in the sample. 
      Elasticity: the estimated coefficient (O`.)of the regression KELMFDG() = O< + O.HQRDSFDG() + T() 
      CNY: Chinese Yuan, GBP: British Pound, JPY: Japanese Yen, CHF: Swiss Franc.  
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Table 4: Full Sample Analyses 
Independent variables CEO Total compensation  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 4.8599*** 4.8563*** 4.8647*** 
 (1.2618) (1.2638) (1.2635) 
FirmRet 0.2211*** 0.2064*** 0.224*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0184) (0.0188) 
PeerRetIS -0.0837***  -0.0817*** 
 (0.0234)  (0.0233) 
PeerRetEX  -0.063* -0.055* 
  (0.0324) (0.0322) 
Ln (Sale) 0.2778*** 0.2772*** 0.2779*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
GrowOption 0.0477* 0.0475* 0.0476* 
 (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.0246) 
CeoTenure 0.1239 0.1271 0.1227 
 (0.3931) (0.394) (0.3936) 
IndVar -0.0365 -0.0383 -0.0345 
 (0.0563) (0.0545) (0.0552) 
ChairD 0.0336 0.0333 0.0337 
 (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0208) 
CeoEquityOwnD -0.034* -0.0342* -0.0339* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.0189) 
InterlockD 0.0245 0.0244 0.0246 
 (0.0444) (0.0444) (0.0444) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
CEO-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.7527 0.7524 0.7527 
Number of observations 20,825 20,830 20,825 
This table shows the following regression results for the full sample. "#$%&'() = "< + O.KLEMFDG() + OU%DDEFDGHI() + OV%DDEFDG#S()+ O^",QGE,+W&EL&X+DY() + T() 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
The variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 5: Sub Sample Analyses-CEO Total Compensation 
Independent variables CEO Total Compensation    
  Variance Industry Var- Industry Full Sample 
Intercept 4.9636*** 3.3583** 2.8777*** 4.8421*** 
 (0.907) (1.695) (0.9441) (1.2672) 
FirmRet 0.2161*** 0.2083*** 0.1974*** 0.2247*** 
 (0.0253) (0.0255) (0.0364) (0.0188) 
PeerRetIS -0.0883** -0.0385 -0.0532 -0.0769*** 
 (0.037) (0.0329) (0.0535) (0.0234) 
PeerRetEX -0.114** -0.0852* -0.1615** 0.0047 
 (0.0457) (0.0451) (0.0646) (0.0387) 
Interaction    -0.1404*** 
    (0.0513) 
Indicator    0.0336* 
    (0.0175) 
Ln (Sale) 0.2449*** 0.3473*** 0.3085*** 0.2774*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0423) (0.0535) (0.025) 
GrowOption 0.0704*** 0.0342 0.0592*** 0.0474* 
 (0.0164) (0.0236) (0.0161) (0.0246) 
CeoTenure -0.0203 -0.3052 -1.6799*** 0.1206 
 (0.502) (0.5268) (0.4431) (0.3947) 
IndVar 0.0592 -0.0056 0.1227*** -0.0321 
 (0.0644) (0.0532) (0.0394) (0.0533) 
ChairD 0.0365 0.0247 -0.0028 0.0338 
 (0.0348) (0.0306) (0.0566) (0.0208) 
CeoEquityOwnD -0.0411 -0.0307 -0.0734** -0.0342* 
 (0.0275) (0.0269) (0.0373) (0.0189) 
InterlockD 0.1182 0.0828 0.2236* 0.0248 
 (0.0761) (0.0628) (0.1239) (0.0444) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.7575 0.7210 0.7327 0.7528 
Number of observations 10,011 10,265 4,884 20,825 
This table shows the following regression results for the sub-sample. "#$%&'() = "< + O.KELMFDG() + OU%DDEFDGHI() + OV%DDEFDG#J()+ O^",QGE,+W&EL&X+DY() + T() 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 6: Sub Sample Analyses-the Change in CEO Total Compensation 
Independent variables The Change in CEO Total Compensation    
  Variance Industry Var- Industry 
Full 
Sample 
Intercept 0.5897 0.0649 -0.5255 7.6697* 
 (0.6435) (0.8425) (1.4931) (4.2942) 
FirmRet 0.311*** 0.3317*** 0.2945*** 0.3434*** 
 (0.0343) (0.0368) (0.0521) (0.0253) 
PeerRetIS -0.0796 -0.0253 -0.0323 -0.0676* 
 (0.0556) (0.0493) (0.0805) (0.0348) 
PeerRetEX -0.179** -0.0868 -0.2166* -0.0149 
 (0.0725) (0.0794) (0.1113) (0.0568) 
Interaction    -0.1667** 
    (0.0718) 
Indicator    0.0422 
    (0.0261) 
Ln (Sale) -0.0723** -0.1281*** -0.133** -0.1007*** 
 (0.0369) (0.0325) (0.0621) (0.0196) 
GrowOption -0.005 0.0004 -0.0127 0.0046 
 (0.027) (0.0194) (0.0296) (0.0151) 
CeoTenure -0.6785 -0.3242 -1.1748 -0.3249 
 (0.4215) (0.3895) (1.1808) (0.2146) 
IndVar 0.5084 -0.0572 0.3874 -0.0424 
 (0.3373) (0.0362) (0.3431) (0.0454) 
ChairD -0.0084 -0.0642 -0.0729 -0.0384 
 (0.0508) (0.0408) (0.0812) (0.0246) 
CeoEquityOwnD 0.0256 0.0121 -0.0027 0.0165 
 (0.0375) (0.0322) (0.0539) (0.0208) 
InterlockD 0.0816 0.0419 0.1716 0.0359 
 (0.0987) (0.0672) (0.1764) (0.0426) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.2541 0.1215 0.2524 0.1177 
Number of observations 8,789 8,693 4,284 17,655 
This table shows the following regression results for the sub-sample. "ℎ-"#$%&'() = "< + O.KLEMFDG() + OU%DDEFDGHI() + OV%DDEFDG#J()+ O^",QGE,+W&EL&X+DY() + T() 
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*, **, and *** denote statistically significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 





















Table 7: Firm Specific Regression 
Estimated coefficients Median Mean Std. dev. N t-Stat. 
Panel A: for single return      
FirmRet 0.1136 0.1457 0.7586 1334 7.0150 
PeerRetIS -0.0615 -0.1031 0.9430 1334 -3.9932 
R2 0.1020 0.1502    
      
FirmRet 0.1491 0.1897 0.6996 1334 9.9037 
PeerRetEX -0.2662 -0.2902 1.3251 1334 -7.9988 
R2 0.1164 0.1629    
      
Panel B: for multiple returns      
FirmRet 0.1598 0.1990 0.8217 1334 8.8454 
PeerRetIS 0.0174 0.0112 1.2183 1334 0.3358 
PeerRetEX -0.2445 -0.3119 1.6713 1334 -6.8161 
R2 0.1934 0.2366       
This table shows the statistics of estimated coefficients of following regression for 
each firm. "#$%&'() = "< + O.KLEMFDG() + OU%DDEFDGHI() + OV%DDEFDG#J() + T() 











Table 8: Oil Price Risk Analyses 
Independent variables CEO Total compensation  
  
Full 





Intercept 4.8633*** 6.4114*** 3.73*** 5.5613*** 4.8603*** 
 (1.2604) (0.3002) (1.2955) (0.4341) (1.268) 
FirmRet 0.2237*** 0.194*** 0.211*** 0.1799*** 0.2239*** 
 (0.0189) (0.026) (0.0232) (0.0359) (0.0189) 
PeerRetIS 
-
0.0826*** 0.0095 -0.0772** 0.0126 
-
0.0788*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0359) (0.0314) (0.0499) (0.0233) 
PeerRetOP -0.0345 
-
0.1303*** -0.0338 -0.1104** 0.0159 
 (0.0303) (0.0424) (0.0382) (0.0517) (0.0391) 
Interaction     -0.1179** 
     (0.0513) 
Indicator     0.014 
     (0.0232) 
Ln (Sale) 0.2778*** 0.2374*** 0.3032*** 0.2412*** 0.278*** 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.0357) (0.0492) (0.0251) 
GrowOption 0.0477* 0.0151 0.0389* 0.0076 0.0476* 
 (0.0246) (0.037) (0.0233) (0.033) (0.0246) 
CeoTenure 0.1234 -0.3778 -0.3076 -1.1662** 0.1258 
 (0.3926) (0.5126) (0.3857) (0.5163) (0.395) 
IndVar -0.0354 -0.0759* 0.0107 -0.0431 -0.0327 
 (0.0554) (0.0415) (0.0606) (0.0363) (0.0543) 
ChairD 0.0338 0.0471* 0.0349 0.0671* 0.0338 
 (0.0208) (0.0285) (0.0287) (0.0393) (0.0208) 
CeoEquityOwnD -0.0341* -0.0486** -0.0332 -0.0589* -0.0345* 
 (0.019) (0.0238) (0.0255) (0.0332) (0.019) 
InterlockD 0.0243 0.0104 0.0955 0.0153 0.0242 
 (0.0443) (0.1042) (0.0585) (0.1258) (0.0444) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.7527 0.7799 0.7413 0.7815 0.7527 
Number of 
observations 20,825 10,625 12,407 6,361 20,825 
This table shows the following regression results. 
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"#$%&'() = "< + O.KLEMFDG() + OU%DDEFDGHI() + OV%DDEFDG$%()+ O^",QGE,+W&EL&X+DY() + T() 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 





Table 9: Interest Rate Risk Analyses 
Independent 
variables 
CEO Total compensation 





Intercept 4.8613*** 5.7133*** 3.3145*** 5.8472*** 4.8251*** 
 (1.2617) (0.4327) (1.2907) (0.4832) (1.2611) 
FirmRet 0.2221*** 0.2385*** 0.1966*** 0.196*** 0.2226*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0241) (0.0244) (0.0311) (0.0187) 
PeerRetIS -0.0834*** -0.0862*** -0.0533* -0.0405 -0.077*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0329) (0.0309) (0.0423) (0.0235) 
PeerRetIN -0.0214 -0.019 -0.0035 -0.032 -0.0154 
 (0.0346) (0.0429) (0.0434) (0.0525) (0.0432) 
Interaction     -0.0115 
     (0.0553) 
Indicator     0.0588*** 
     (0.0199) 
Ln (Sale) 0.2776*** 0.2837*** 0.321*** 0.3066*** 0.2782*** 
 (0.025) (0.0318) (0.0397) (0.0477) (0.025) 
GrowOption 0.0477* 0.0401 0.0374 0.0312 0.0473* 
 (0.0246) (0.0269) (0.0246) (0.0268) (0.0245) 
CeoTenure 0.1226 0.1259 -0.4365 -0.3234 0.1131 
 (0.3932) (0.4929) (0.4347) (0.55) (0.393) 
IndVar -0.0358 0.1195 -0.0156 0.1172 -0.0375 
 (0.0559) (0.0956) (0.0574) (0.0768) (0.0545) 
ChairD 0.0337 0.0514* 0.0426 0.0866** 0.034 
 (0.0208) (0.0284) (0.0308) (0.0425) (0.0208) 
CeoEquityOwnD -0.034* -0.0222 -0.0315 -0.0037 -0.0344* 
 (0.019) (0.03) (0.0268) (0.0444) (0.0189) 
InterlockD 0.0245 0.003 0.0404 0.0192 0.0252 
 (0.0444) (0.0504) (0.0588) (0.0702) (0.0444) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.7526 0.7273 0.7117 0.6762 0.7528 
Number of 
observations 20,825 12,304 10,847 6,425 20,825 
This table shows the following regression results.  
 42 
"#$%&'() = "< + O.KLEMFDG() + OU%DDEFDGHI() + OV%DDEFDGHb()+ O^",QGE,+W&EL&X+DY() + T() 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
The variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
 
